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Limits of patient isolation measures to control
extended-spectrum beta-lactamase–producing
Enterobacteriaceae: model-based analysis of
clinical data in a pediatric ward
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Abstract
Background: Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase–producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-E) are a growing concern in
hospitals and the community. How to control the nosocomial ESBL-E transmission is a matter of debate. Contact
isolation of patients has been recommended but evidence supporting it in non-outbreak settings has been
inconclusive.
Methods: We used stochastic transmission models to analyze retrospective observational data from a two-phase
intervention in a pediatric ward, successively implementing single-room isolation and patient cohorting in an
isolation ward, combined with active ESBL-E screening.
Results: For both periods, model estimates suggested reduced transmission from isolated/cohorted patients.
However, most of the incidence originated from sporadic sources (i.e. independent of cross-transmission),
unaffected by the isolation measures. When sporadic sources are high, our model predicted that even substantial
efforts to prevent transmission from carriers would have limited impact on ESBL-E rates.
Conclusions: Our results provide evidence that, considering the importance of sporadic acquisition, e.g.
endogenous selection of resistant strains following antibiotic treatment, contact-isolation measures alone might not
suffice to control ESBL-E. They also support the view that estimating cross-transmission extent is key to predicting
the relative success of contact-isolation measures. Mathematical models could prove useful for those estimations
and guide decisions concerning the most effective control strategy.
Keywords: ESBL-E, Healthcare epidemiology, Bacterial pathogens, Mathematical modeling, Statistical inference
Background
Multidrug-resistant bacteria are a continuing threat in
hospital settings, causing a high morbidity and mortality
worldwide [1]. Among Gram-negative bacteria, resistance
to beta-lactams mainly results from extended-spectrum
beta-lactamase, a major group of plasmid-mediated en-
zymes conferring resistance to the penicillins and first- to
third-generation cephalosporins [2]. Extended-spectrum
beta-lactamase–producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-E)
are becoming increasingly prevalent in hospitals, with
consequences now documented in terms of increased
mortality and delayed onset of effective therapy [3]. More-
over, it is now recognized that ESBL-E also spread in the
community, which can serve as a reservoir for hospitals
[4,5]. Strategies to control the spread of multiresistant
bacteria, particularly ESBL-E, in hospitals are being de-
bated [6,7], and disparities in infection-control practices
have been reported as a consequence [8]. Enhanced bar-
rier precautions are advocated and some authors (albeit
not all, see [9]) have reported successful curtailment of
outbreaks using those measures [10,11]. In the non-
outbreak setting, however, achieving ESBL-E control is
more difficult and, to date, the evidence for efficacy of
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barrier precautions has been scarce [12], and sometimes
inconclusive [13].
ESBL-E colonization can result from patient-to-patient
transmission and/or emergence or selection during anti-
biotic therapy. Given the relative importance of these
two routes, different interventions can be implemented
to control one or both sources [14]. Contact isolation of
carriers is typically used to interrupt transmission from
detected colonized/infected patients, but is not expected
to affect endogenous selection [7]. Contact isolation of
patients is currently recommended by several guidelines
but concerns exist that isolation might, in some cases,
lower the quality of care [15]. Contact isolation can in-
clude a wide spectrum of interventions, ranging from
barrier nursing (e.g. gowns and gloves) to a full isolation
ward with designated staff (i.e. nurse cohorting). It is
likely that the impact of any such intervention will
depend on locally variable factors (e.g. the case-mix of
patients, physical environment, available resources) and
the epidemiology of the pathogen [7]. Considering the
substantial resources involved in a screening-and-isola-
tion program [13,16], it is of paramount importance to
determine their efficacy accurately. In addition, while
major efforts have been devoted to understand the im-
pact of interventions on controlling the spread of Gram-
positive pathogens, reliable evidence for Gram-negative
bacteria, including ESBL-E, is lacking [14].
Herein, we used observational data from a two-phase
intervention study in a pediatric ward, during which we
successively implemented two contact-isolation strat-
egies (single-room isolation and isolation ward with
nurse cohorting), combined with active surveillance for
ESBL-E carriage. Using mechanistic modeling, our aims
were to gain insight into ESBL-E epidemiology, clarify
the role of contact isolation in preventing ESBL-E spread
and predict effective interventions in various settings.
Methods
Ethics statement
This study used observational data collected as part of
systematic routine surveillance procedures in a univer-
sity hospital ward, with an endemic level of multidrug-
resistant bacteria. This surveillance protocol followed
the official recommendations of the French Ministry of
Health and the French Society for Hygiene (http://sante.
gouv.fr/les-infections-nosocomiales-recommandations-aux-
etablissements-de-soins.html) and was approved by the
Nosocomial Infections Fighting Committee. All the pa-
tients’ parents received general information about the hos-
pital infection control strategy at admission. No more
information than those collected by routine procedures was
used; in particular, no additional individual data, biological
collection or sample was required. Therefore, an ethics
committee approval was not required for this study.
Setting and description of interventions
Necker Enfants–Malades is a 650-bed tertiary-care
teaching hospital that handles 55 000 admissions per
year. The pediatrics department includes a 21-bed unit
that admits 300–350 children annually. Approximately
half of the children are referred from other hospitals,
20% from other units in the hospital, and the remaining
30% from the emergency department. In May 2009, a
whole-ward screening revealed an unusually high ESBL-
E prevalence among patients, which prompted the
subsequent interventions, beginning in June 2009 and
described below. All children admitted from 1 June
2009 through 15 July 2010 were included in our study.
All episodes of ESBL-E colonization or infection diag-
nosed during the stay or up to 2 days after discharge
from the pediatric ward were included. During the
study period, a rectal swab specimen was obtained at
admission and once a week throughout each child’s stay.
Swabs were plated on a selective chromogenic medium
for ESBL screening (chromID ESBL Agar, bioMérieux,
Marcy-l’Etoile, France). Enterobacteriaceae were iso-
lated and identified according to the recommendations
of the Comité de l’Antibiogramme de la Société Française
de Microbiologie. ESBL production was evaluated with the
double-disc synergy test and the Etest (AB Biodisk, Solna,
Sweden) for ceftazidime and ceftazidime–clavulanate. Pa-
tients with ESBL-E isolated within 48 hours following
admission from screening samples or from an infected site
were considered imported. Other cases were considered
acquired.
Infection control measures
From June 2009 through February 2010 (first period,
P1), the following baseline infection-control practices
were in place in the pediatrics ward. All children with
ESBL-E–positivity in clinical or screening specimens
were placed in single rooms and in contact isolation,
within 24 h following test results. Briefly, these measures
consisted of flagging microbiological reports, charts and
doors of rooms of ESBL-E–positive patients with a
warning symbol; wearing gowns and gloves when caring
for these patients; emphasizing hand hygiene before and
after patient contact; and notifying ESBL-E carriage
when patients were transferred to another unit. Contact
isolation was maintained throughout the entire duration
of hospitalization. During the second period (P2), from
February 2010 to July 2010, a cohorting protocol was
added to the aforementioned measures. All known ESBL-
E carriers were moved and grouped at one end of the
pediatrics ward in an 8-bed unit, and cared for by a dedi-
cated nursing team. The isolation policy was similar to P1,
except that previously known carriers (i.e. patients with an
episode of ESBL-E carriage in the past 6 months) were
placed in isolation immediately upon admission.
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Mathematical model
We assessed the effectiveness of isolation measures by
means of a stochastic, population-based transmission
model, building on previously described models [17,18].
Patients can be in four mutually exclusive states, depend-
ing on their colonization and isolation status (Figure 1).
Patients can be susceptible (S) or colonized, with the latter
subdivided as isolated (I) or unisolated, distinguished as
imported cases (patients colonized at admission C1) or ac-
quired cases (patients acquiring ESBL-E in the unit, C2).
Susceptible patients are at risk of acquiring ESBL-E at a
rate λ = β0 + β1(C1 +C2) + β2I, where β1 and β2 are the
transmission rates from unisolated and isolated ESBL-E
carriers, respectively, and β0 represents the non-cross–
transmission acquisition rate. Although it is common
practice to include both cross-transmission and non-cross
–transmission terms in transmission models, their exact
interpretation is subtle. In our model, these quantities are
just two components of the attack rate: β1 and β2 scale
that component proportional to the number of carriers
(unisolated and isolated, respectively), while β0 quantifies
the component independent of the number of carriers.
With respect to ESBL-E dynamics, the cross-transmission
characteristic is not whether it is transmitted through the
contaminated hands of healthcare workers, environmental
contamination, fomites etc., but whether its rate depends
on previous numbers of carriers in the ward (the so-called
colonization pressure [19]). In contrast, sporadic acquisi-
tions are decoupled from the previous ESBL-E dynamics
in the ward. Within hospital settings, these acquisitions
can include endogenous selection of a previously un-
detected colonizing strain after antibiotic therapy, which
can reasonably be considered to be independent of ESBL-
E prevalence in the ward [20,21]. Below, we refer to such
acquisitions as sporadic, quantified by the sporadic acqui-
sition rate β0. Cross-transmission is quantified by the
transmission rates β1 and β2, and, because isolated ESBL-
E–positive patients are managed under special contact
precautions, we expect β1>β2.
Imported cases are isolated at rate δ1, and δ2 for ac-
quired cases, with δ1>δ2. When the isolation ward
reaches full capacity, the possibility of isolating a patient
no longer exists, until an isolated patient is discharged,
i.e. the isolation rate is Δ(C*,I)=δ*C* if I <NI, 0 otherwise.
Because the duration of ESBL-E carriage (estimated at
6 months [22]) typically exceeds hospital lengths of stay,
we did not account for possible carriage clearance during
the stay. The preemptive isolation of previously known
carriers in P2 is modeled as an additional parameter ∈,
representing the proportion of colonized inpatients im-
mediately placed in isolation at admission.
Model parameters
The parameters used in the model are defined in Table 1.
Some of them could be computed directly from the
dataset. Discharge rates were computed from the pa-
tients’ observed lengths of stay recorded in the unit, as-
suming that all unisolated patients had the same risk of
being discharged. Isolation rates were computed as the
reciprocal of the mean time to isolation. For imported
cases, this time was 2 days during P1, and 0 days during
P2, i.e. we assumed that all colonized inpatients were put
in preemptive isolation for this period. For simplicity, we
also assumed that all patients put in preemptive isolation
during P2 were indeed carriers. For acquired cases, be-
cause the exact time from acquisition to isolation was
unknown, it was assumed to be 4 days. Compared to
single-bed isolation rooms, an isolation ward has a clear
face validity, meaning that a well-implemented isolation
ward with designated staff will effectively prevent all
transmission from cohorted patients [23]. However, that
assumption does not hold for weaker types of isolation,
including single-room isolation, whose effectiveness is a
priori unclear [18]. Therefore, we set β2 = 0 for P2, but
estimated the P1 value. Other acquisition parameters,
namely β0 and β1, and the admission prevalence σ were
estimated from data for both periods.
Numerical implementation and estimation method
The model was implemented in the pomp package [24],
operating in the R environment [25]. Stochastic simula-
tions of the model were performed using Gillespie’s exact
algorithm [26]. Parameters were estimated with the iter-
ated filtering algorithm, described elsewhere [27]. Profile
likelihoods were used to derive 95% confidence intervals
(CI) [28]. Technical details about model implementation
Figure 1 Model representation. Compartments represent different
epidemiological states. Parameters are defined in Table 1. Arrows
indicate transitions between states, which occur at a rate given by
the parameter. The term ∆(C*,I) represents an isolation function, such
as ∆(C*,I)=δ*C* if I < NI (at least one isolation bed available),
0 otherwise.
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and estimation are given in the electronic supplementary
material (Additional file 1); the estimation procedure was
also verified by using simulated data (Additional file 2).
Model evaluation
Model fitting was assessed by visual inspection for both
weekly point prevalence (i.e. point prevalence on Monday)
and weekly incidence data. 10 000 model simulations were
used to derive mean values and 95% prediction intervals,
and were compared to observed P1 and P2 data.
Results
Parameter estimates and model checking
P1 and P2, respectively, consisted of 4165 and 2305
patient-days (pt-d). The incidence of ESBL-E acquisition
was 7.0 per 1 000 pt-d during P1 and decreased to 4.3
Table 1 Model parameters for both intervention periods
Parameter Symbol P1 P2
Sporadic acquisition rate β0 0.009 (0.002–0.022) 0.008 (0.001–0.015)
Transmission rate from unisolated patients β1 0.006 (0–0.017) 0.006 (0–0.016)
Transmission rate from isolated patients β2 0.001 (0–0.005) 0
Admission prevalence σ 0.18 (0.14–0.22) 0.15 (0.11–0.21)
Isolation rate for imported and acquired cases δ1,δ2 0.5, 0.25 0.5, 0.25
Fraction of colonized inpatients placed in preemptive isolation  0 1
Discharge rates of susceptible, colonized and isolated patients μS,μC,μI 0.2, 0.2, 0.13 0.18, 0.18, 0.13
Number of patients N 16 16
Number of isolation beds NI 16 8
Parameters in boldface were estimated from data using the iterated filtering algorithm, as explained in the main text. For these parameters, the maximum
likelihood estimates (95% confidence intervals) are indicated. Rates are day–1.
Table 2 Epidemiological data for both intervention periods
Data P1 P2
Screening policy all patients, at admission and every Monday all patients, at admission and every Monday
Isolation policy within 24 h following test positivity preemptive isolation of colonized inpatients,
otherwise within 24 h following positivity
Type of isolation single room 8-bed ward
Overflow policy — admissions stopped
Admissions, no. 690 333
Days (pt-d) 260 (4165) 148 (2305)
Mean occupancy (range) 16 (6–22) 16 (9–20)
Mean staff-to-patient ratio (range) 0.89 (0.45–2.2) 0.85 (0.5–1.5)
Mean length of stay (range), days 6 (0–83) 6.7 (0–71)
Acquisitions, no. 29 10
K. pneumoniae 20 7
E. coli 4 0
Other species 5 3
Incidence, per 1 000 pt-d 7.0 4.3
K. pneumoniae 4.8 3.0
E. coli 1.0 0.0
Other species 1.2 1.3
Prevalence, % 26 21
K. pneumoniae 18 15
E. coli 3 2
Other species 5 4
The prevalence was computed as the ratio of the total number of colonized patient-days to the total number of patient-days for each period. The incidence was
computed as the ratio of the number of acquisitions to the total number of patient-days for each period. The staff-to-patient ratio was computed as the daily
ratio of the number of staff members (nurses and ward assistants) to the number of patients. pt-d: patient-days.
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per 1 000 pt-d during P2. A similar trend was observed
for ESBL-E prevalence, from 26% during P1 to 21% dur-
ing P2 (Table 2). Figure 2 reports the time-series for
point prevalence and incidence data. Although estimates
for P1 were consistent with higher transmission from
unisolated patients (β1 > β2, Table 1), the difference was
not statistically significant compared to isolated patients
(95% CI for β1 − β2, -0.005–0.018 per day). Moreover,
only the sporadic acquisition rate was statistically signifi-
cant, while transmission rates were not (likelihood ratio
tests, null hypotheses β1 = 0 and β2 = 0, p-values 0.16
and 0.35, respectively). Admission prevalence was esti-
mated at 0.18. Model assessment suggested very good fit
to point prevalence and incidence data (Figure 3). The
fitted model predicted a total of 30 (20–42) acquisitions,
i.e. a 7.2 (4.8–10.1)/1 000 pt-d incidence, compared with
29 observed acquisitions, i.e. 7.0/1 000 pt-d incidence,
corresponding to a predicted 3.4/1 000 pt-d incidence
due to sporadic sources, 2.6/1 000 pt-d to transmission
from unisolated carriers and 1.2/1 000 pt-d from isolated
carriers. Therefore, sporadic acquisitions accounted for
nearly 50% of new cases in the ward during P1.
During P2, the isolation ward had little impact on ac-
quisition rates: the sporadic acquisition rate remained
the only statistically significant source of acquisitions in
the ward, while transmission from unisolated patients
remained unchanged and insignificant (likelihood ratio
test, null hypothesis β1 = 0, p-value 0.2). Admission
prevalence was estimated at 0.15 for this period. Again,
model fitting was adequate, with a total of 10 (4–18)
predicted acquisitions, a 4.2 (1.7–7.6)/1 000 pt-d inci-
dence, compared to 10 observed acquisitions (Figure 3),
corresponding to a predicted 3.4/1 000 pt-d incidence
resulting from sporadic sources and 0.8/1 000 pt-d a
consequence of transmission from unisolated carriers,
while the incidence due to cohorted patients was hypo-
thetically set at 0. Crucially, the incidence resulting from
sporadic acquisitions was unaffected by the isolation-
ward implementation.
Although we estimated parameters separately for P1
and P2, estimations of acquisition parameters for the en-
tire period are relevant. Doing so, β1 was estimated at
0.006 (0–0.015) per day and β0 at 0.008 (0.002–0.015)
per day. Thus, transmission from unisolated carriers
remained statistically insignificant but a trend was ob-
served (likelihood ratio test, null hypothesis β1 = 0, p-
value 0.08).
Comparing interventions
Because the preintervention period was not observed, a
baseline incidence could not be computed to compare
the relative efficacies of the two interventions. Further-
more, the isolation-policy change for imported cases
during P2 (preemptive isolation of previously known
carriers) might obfuscate the precise contribution of the
isolation ward to the observed incidence decline.
Figure 2 Time-series for point prevalence and incidence data. Point-prevalence numbers of colonized patients (upper panel) and cumulated
weekly numbers of acquisitions (lower panel) are represented. The vertical dot-dashed line at week 37 indicates isolation-ward implementation.
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Therefore, in addition to the observed interventions dur-
ing P1 and P2, we used model simulations to predict the
impact of two hypothetical situations: no isolation what-
soever, and an isolation ward without preemptive isola-
tion, as summarized in Table 3. In the absence of
isolation measures (β2 = β1), the predicted incidence was
14.6/1 000 pt-d, a two-fold increase compared to P1.
Had the isolation ward been implemented without pre-
emptive isolation of known carriers, the predicted inci-
dence was 5.9/1 000 pt-d, 16% lower than the observed
incidence during P1. Overall, these simulations suggested
that single-room isolation effectively lowered ESBL-E in-
cidence and that the isolation ward would have had little
benefit compared to single-room isolation, had the isola-
tion policy been similar. However, broadly overlapping
prediction intervals, reflecting parameter-estimate un-
certainty (particularly the insignificance of transmission
parameters), preclude a definitive conclusion regarding
interventions from these model simulations.
Predicting the impact of multifaceted interventions
We attempted to investigate the expected impact of con-
tact isolation (aimed at reducing patient-to-patient trans-
mission) in combination with measures targeting other
acquisition sources (e.g. antimicrobial stewardship pro-
gram to reduce endogenous acquisition). We used inci-
dence of colonization per 1 000 pt-d as the outcome
criterion and simulated the expected impact of contact
isolation for various levels of isolation effectiveness (0–
100% effective) and different values for sporadic acquisi-
tion (Figure 4). When sporadic acquisition sources are
high, the model predicted that even substantial efforts to
interrupt transmission from isolated patients would have
limited impact on lowering the ESBL-E incidence. For
Figure 3 Model fit to data. Mean (dashed lines) and 95% prediction intervals (dotted lines) are represented for point-prevalence and weekly
incidence data. Point-overlaid continuous lines indicate observed values. The vertical dot-dashed line at week 37 indicates the isolation-
ward implementation.
Table 3 Comparing interventions
Intervention Predicted incidence (per 1 000 pt-d) Observed incidence (per 1 000 pt-d)
No isolation 14.3 (2.4–30) —
Single-room isolation 7.2 (2.5–13.9) 7.0
Isolation ward without preemptive isolation 5.9 (2–10.5) —
Isolation ward with preemptive isolation 4.2 (0.9–7.4) 4.3
Predicted intervals were based on 1000 model simulations. Dashes indicate hypothetical interventions that were only simulated, and, therefore, not observed.
pt-d: patient-days.
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example, for β0 = 0.02 acquisitions per susceptible patient
per day, no contact isolation resulted in an 18/1 000 pt-d
incidence, whereas completely effective contact isolation
yielded a 10/1 000 pt-d incidence, i.e. a 44% incidence re-
duction. Conversely, when acting simultaneously on spor-
adic sources of acquisition and cross-transmission, a
better control would be expected. Assuming that sporadic
sources are fully contained, totally effective contact isola-
tion would be expected to reach a 2/1 000 pt-d incidence,
compared to 11/1 000 pt-d without any contact isolation,
an 82% decline.
Impact of screening policy at admission
We investigated the impact of screening and isolating
ESBL-E-positive patients at admission while varying the
admission prevalence from 0 to 20%, and assuming that
cross-transmission occurs in the ward (Figure 5). When
the admission prevalence was low, screening patients at
admission had little or no benefit, regardless of the isola-
tion rate. For rising admission prevalences, a higher de-
gree of control could be achieved by screening and
isolating colonized inpatients more-and-more rapidly. For
example, for an admission prevalence of 20%, the pre-
dicted incidence was 11/1 000 pt-d without any screening
and could be lowered to 6–7/1 000 pt-d when colonized
inpatients were detected and isolated within 2 days.
Sensitivity analysis
For acquired cases, isolation was assumed to occur 4 days
after acquisition. However, because the exact acquisition
date was unknown, this value was uncertain. Likewise, the
value of direct-isolation proportion during P2 was uncer-
tain, because previously unknown carriers colonized at ad-
mission could have been missed. Therefore, we conducted
sensitivity analyses for these two parameters and found
that even large variations of their values had little impact
on our estimates (Additional file 1).
Discussion
We used mechanistic modeling to assess the impact of
contact-isolation measures to prevent ESBL-E spread in a
pediatrics ward based on clinical data covering a 14-month
period. ESBL-E incidence and mean prevalence decreased
during the study period, and model estimates suggested
that these declines were attributable to reduced transmis-
sion from isolated/cohorted patients. However, most of the
incidence originated from sporadic sources, which were
unaffected by contact isolation. When those sources are
elevated, the model predicted that even substantial efforts
to interrupt transmission from positive patients would
have limited impact on controlling ESBL-E. Conversely,
targeting both patient-to-patient transmission and spor-
adic sources would dramatically diminish incidence.
Several mathematical models have addressed the effect
of contact isolation on methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
Figure 4 Predicted impact of multifaceted interventions.
Contour plot of incidence is represented for different levels of
isolation effectiveness (1 − β2/β1, x-axis) and sporadic acquisition rate
(β0, y-axis). Increasing incidence values are indicated by ever darker
shades of gray, black lines delineate incidence contours with the
corresponding threshold value (per 1 000 patient-days). For these
simulations, β1 was set to 0.006 per day, other model parameters
were those in P1 (Table 1).
Figure 5 Impact of screening at admission. Contour plot of
incidence is represented for different levels of admission prevalence
(σ, x-axis) and isolation rate of imported cases (δ1, y-axis). Increasing
incidence values are indicated by ever darker shades of gray, black
lines delineate incidence contours with the corresponding threshold
value (per 1 000 patient-days). For these simulations, model
parameters values were those estimated or fixed in P1 (Table 1).
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aureus acquisition rates [17,18], but, to our knowledge,
not on ESBL-E. We found weak evidence for transmission
reduction associated with barrier precautions for isolation
measures other than nurse and patient cohorting. While
some patient-to-patient transmission was clinically likely
(which is why we included it in the model and quantified
its magnitude), the statistical signal in our small dataset
was not strong enough to be able to rule out the hy-
pothesis that there was no transmission with any degree
of certainty. A robust result, however, was that the dom-
inant ESBL-E–acquisition source was not associated
with patient-to-patient transmission. These findings are
consistent with recent reports indicating that in-hospital
ESBL-E transmission is low in the non-outbreak setting
[29-31]. Although we referred to non-cross–transmission
sources as sporadic, the term “endogenous” has been
coined to describe acquisition from a patient’s own flora
driven by the selective pressure of antibiotics [21]. Using a
comparable model for cephalosporin-resistant Entero-
bacteriaceae, Bootsma et al. found the endogenous route
to be the quasi-exclusive source of acquisitions in two in-
tensive care units [20]. Indeed, antibiotic use is recognized
as a major risk factor of ESBL-E acquisition, especially in
the non-outbreak setting. The mechanism involved might
be the disruption of the anaerobic microflora in the
intestinal tract, causing the suppression of a defense
mechanism (the so-called colonization resistance) against
antibiotic-resistant pathogens [32]. The persistently high
ESBL-E incidence during our study, despite aggressive de-
tection and isolation, particularly in P2, could therefore be
explained by unrestricted antibiotic use.
In recent years, ESBL-E have also emerged as import-
ant pathogens in the community. Elevated rates were
reported and could result in a high influx of colonized
patients into hospitals [5,33]. In light of this potentially
large reservoir, the usefulness of screening patients at
admission, or at all, has been questioned in non-epidemic
situations [16,34]. Indeed, our results indicated that
screening at admission would have little or no benefit
when admission prevalence is low (<5%). For higher levels,
they showed that some degree of control could be
achieved by screening admitted patients. Admittedly, these
results hold only if cross-transmission is extensive, for
which we provided only weak evidence in this modeling
study but which might be stronger in other settings.
Our study has several limitations. With respect to the
mathematical model, a series of assumptions were made
that merit being discussed. Patients were assumed to be
homogeneous regarding the risk of acquiring or trans-
mitting ESBL-E, even though risk factors for ESBL-E
carriage have been described [4]. More generally, like
other modeling studies, several factors were omitted that
could contribute markedly to ESBL-E spread, particu-
larly staffing ratios and bed occupancy rates [35], even
though both quantities were comparable in P1 and P2
(Table 2). More detailed models, such as individual-
based models, are more appropriate to incorporate those
factors [36], but at the cost of being more difficult to
parameterize when limited data are available.
The assumption that no transmission originated from
isolated patients in P2 might seem questionable. Adopting
another hypothesis, however, would have led to violate the
assumption of homogeneous mixing between patients that
was made in the model formulation. Admittedly, imper-
fect separation between patients may have occurred; yet
detecting such breaches would have required a close mon-
itoring of staff contacts (e.g. with wearable sensors [37]),
and a more elaborate model (e.g. network-based [38]) to
integrate those data.
The test for detecting ESBL-E carriage was assumed to
have perfect sensitivity. Relaxing that assumption, the
sensitivity was estimated at 0.85 (0.56–1), and, therefore,
not significantly different from 100%. In addition, assum-
ing an imperfect sensitivity had little impact on the esti-
mates, as judged by a simulation study (Additional file 2).
Concerning the internal validity of our results, because
a hygiene-enhancement program was implemented con-
comitantly, we cannot rule out that the limited impact
of patient-to-patient transmission was, indeed, due to that
intervention, rather than to isolation measures. Hand-
hygiene compliance was estimated from several audits
during the study period and was high (>80%). Therefore,
cross-transmission can be greater in units where compli-
ance is lower. However, even in such settings, sporadic
acquisition would still be expected to be contributory.
Molecular-typing methods were not used to verify the
findings of our transmission model, a clear limitation of
the present study. Nevertheless, the difficulties of consid-
ering those methods as the standard reference (e.g. related
to the discriminatory power of the method used, the
arbitrary definition of an epidemiological linkage between
two cases etc.) have been discussed [20,39]. Notwithstand-
ing this point, previous studies reported that, when used,
both mathematical modeling and genotyping approaches
yielded comparable results [21,40].
Interventions were prompted by an unusually high
ESBL-E prevalence in the ward, a situation possibly lead-
ing to regression to the mean effects when assessing iso-
lation measures [23]. Finally, our observations, obtained
in an endemic setting, cannot be transposed to outbreak
settings. Previous reports have shown that ESBL-E out-
breaks often involve a particular epidemic and/or viru-
lent clone, and contact isolation was able to eradicate
ESBL-E before it became endemic [11,41].
Conclusions
In conclusion, our results showed that, because of sub-
stantial sporadic acquisition sources, contact-isolation
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measures alone might not suffice to substantially reduce
ESBL-E rates in hospital settings. The model could read-
ily be extended to include more features, which might
make it applicable to the analysis of other nosocomial
pathogens as well. In light of these observations, it would
be pertinent to investigate further the interplay between
barrier precautions and antibiotic use, and the possible
trade-off that might exist to choose the most effective
control strategy.
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